An inadequate “Case Against Christianity”
“The Case Against Christianity” by Michael Martin, (Temple Press, Philadelphia, 1991) is written by a capital “A” Atheist, one who evangelizes for atheism. Having been an atheist for thirty years prior to becoming a theist, I have no problem with someone publishing a book in support of atheism. However, I would have expected something better than this from a professor of philosophy. Despite the claims on the back of the cover, the scholarship is lacking to the point of appearing as intellectual cowardliness, the premises of the argument are set up to guarantee his “winning,” and he sets up a caricature of Christianity as being the whole or at least the majority of it. His technique could be described as episodes of particular specificity surrounded by large amounts of generality. I think the writing could be described as rhetorical not scholarly. He also depends on a lack of proof being taken as disproof of Christian positions, as he presents them. This of course is a logical fallacy, so is not explicitly presented but is implied throughout the book. It is exactly the kind of book, I in my atheistic days, untrained in philosophy and having only a smattering of scholarship in the area would have written. As such it does a disservice to all involved, Christians, atheists, and philosophers, trivializing centuries of debate.
Were it not for the current atmosphere of hostility to Judeo-Christian belief in our society, this book could be ignored. Considering that it is twenty years old and little or no mention has been made of it, that I have seen, it has been ignored. However, it is also an example of the kind of argumentation that can have persuasiveness to wannabe intellectuals, who read it as support of their adoption of atheism, without the knowledge to evaluate it uncritically. (Even those who should be critical apparently aren’t, given their support on the back cover.) Apparently being an Atheist, as opposed to an atheist, blinds one to ones own illogic and poor argumentation, just as Fundamentalism blinds one to the current status of science and scholarly religious discourse. This review is presented to make an object lesson of this book in how not to argue religious questions.
From the first, Professor Martin engages in the use of sweeping generalization of history, dismissing the first few hundred years of debate over what constitutes the correct Christian doctrines as a massive suppression of dissent by the church. He also sees the rise of Biblical Criticism and emergence of Science in the Nineteenth Century as an attack on Christian doctrine not as an attempt better understand the world. An in-depth study of both of these periods would show it to be much more complex than that.
At this point he justifies his book and presents us with these two paragraphs:
The claims being made here are breath-taking in their sweep and scope. First is his claim that the book is an “adequate, systematic, philosophical critique.” Second is that it is the first such critique. The third is that his discussion is correct and rational, and finally that his rationality of argument is sufficient to cause a reversal of belief. If one looks at the footnotes, his reputed critical sources are pamphleteers from the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. There are no sources from the work of Higher Criticism that arose at that time. He places himself among poor competition from the start. But worse is his complete ignorance or active ignoring of the centuries of debate that started in the Seventeenth Century over Christian doctrine and its applicability. He is definitely not the first systematic critic. His last sentence is what is so wonderfully arrogant. Restated he says, “I am right and therefore you should change your beliefs. To not do so is to be irrational.” Rationality is based on premises that are given not proven. His premises have to be as convincing as those he is trying to replace, and the logic must flow without choices from those premises. Essentially he is making a claim to infallibility, since he creates an imperative statement.
He next establishes what he will call Christianity against which to make his case. He starts with the creeds, Apostle’s, Nicene, and Athanasian. His presentation of the creeds and their history is quite fair. He uses an obscure 1877 book by Phillip Schaff, who Professor Martin describes as a scholar of the creeds, to support his claim that they are accepted and provide a description of their purposes in mainline churches. In my mind this is pseudo-scholarship. The fact that the three creeds are in prayer books and hymnals and used at services in almost all Christian churches is sufficient. He is simply trying to create a gloss of scholarship on his writing here. He then compares and discusses the various beliefs stated in the creeds and from that creates definitions of the beliefs of a “Basic Christian,” a “Liberal Christian,” and an “Orthodox Christian.”
It is in creating his definitions that he uses a stylistic device that is apparently an attempt to create the impression of deep analysis. He uses formal logic to create the definitions. Example:
“Person P is a Basic Christian if and only if P believes that …..”
Or
“Person P is an Orthodox Christian if and only if P is a Basic Christian and P believes…..”
This type of formality is only used here and in one or two other places. Yet nowhere does the reasoning or discussion use these formalities. I have seen the same kinds of devices in my early writing when I was trying to pretend I was very knowledgeable. Unfortunately, I suspect the same thing here. He then introduces an extra belief statement that Jesus is the model of ethical behavior. He also adds to the definition that a Christian attempts to follow the ethical teachings of Jesus.
At this point, he appears to be reasonable enough, and one can easily accept his starting premises so far. Based on what occurs in the rest of the book, one has to be very careful. He is actually setting up a bait and switch. He will define Orthodox Christianity very rigidly, add biblical literalism, attack it in detail, then claim he has made a case against Christianity, when all he has done is point out the illogic of literal reading and interpretation of the creeds and the Bible.
In the Introduction which we are still considering, he states that these articles of belief are assumptions, and then raises some questions concerning them. Here is where we see some beginnings of tilting the argument in the givens. He divides the beliefs into three groups, historical, theological, and ethical. That of itself is not an issue, it is how he sorts them that starts creating concern.
He groups the existence of Jesus, the Virgin Birth, the Crucifixion by Pilate, and the Resurrection as historical theses. He then states that historical methods are applicable to determining the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. He also makes the claim that historical research is relevant to the determination of the truth of the Second Coming, and in deciding whether Jesus was the Son of God and not a mere man. He also wants to use historical evidence in Jesus’ teachings about salvation and ethics. First of all, he is asking us to agree to the historicity of these events as determining their truth or falsity. These are articles of faith. To some degree they are based on historical events, but one does not make an argument strictly from history in these cases. Moreover, he is also making a claim that he can present a historical case for or against these. As we continue in the book, he does a poor job of it compared to the work I have seen written by true historians.
Considering that the issue of the Virgin Birth may possibly hinge on translation issues of the Koine Greek passages and on interpretation of other scripture, which is contentious in itself, it is hard to believe that historical analysis can provide light here. There have been many previous discussions of the Virgin Birth, and my former pastor said, “My belief is not based on the state of Mary’s hymen.” Of course this puts him outside the author’s definition of an Orthodox Christian, which, as we shall see, is what he is attacking. So the Virgin Birth is as important to our author’s case as it may be to some Christians. The literal Virgin Birth is essential to his case.
The Resurrection is still another issue that does not seem readily amenable to historical methods. The empty tomb may well be in the domain of history, but the explanations may not. The appearances of Jesus after death may be questioned, but ultimately one has not a definitive acceptance or rejection by logic and analysis, but a decision based on one’s own evaluation of the evidence for and against. It is a “fuzzy logic” decision. As for the Second Coming, it is a prediction not a historical event. What we shall see is that he wants to use the absolute, literal statements on when the Second Coming will occur to discredit it.
We shall leave the use of history to decide if Jesus was the Son of God and Jesus’ teachings until the author discusses them.
He then states that the assumptions of the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation, and salvation through faith in Jesus raise theological issues as well. He asks some example questions, some of which are immediately not literally true, and some of which have engaged theologians for centuries. He also questions whether Jesus’ ethical views are plausible and if they should be a model of ethical behavior.
The remainder of the Introduction lays out the overall approach of the book. He also mentions that he has two appendices on Divine Command theory of ethics and theories of Atonement. I am not sure why he includes these since he admits that Divine Command theory of ethics is not part of his definition of Christianity, and theory of Atonement is not part of any of the creeds.
This is an ambitious program, requiring the abilities of a historian, a theologian, and an ethicist. People have made a lifetime career of discussion one of the issues he raises, and he is going to cover them all. And, as we shall see, he believes that if one destroys these beliefs by the use of logic one must have destroyed a belief in Christianity or else be deemed irrational. What he forgets is that failure to prove is not disproof. He also is extremely dependent on a rigid, literal interpretation of the Bible, a view that is in the minority of Christianity today.
In the first chapter of the book, “The Basis of Christian Belief,” he asks the question, “Under what conditions should one believe Christian doctrines?” This is the first step in creating a tilted playing field for the discussion. He is assuming that belief is conditional, and that people arrive at belief via reason. For he then answers his question, “Surely the answer that recommends itself to reason and common sense is: Other things being equal, one should believe them only if there are good reasons to do so.” Of course his goal is to show there are no good reasons to do so. What is totally ignored is that religious issues are not decided solely on the basis of reason. They are more often decided on the basis of emotional perception and subjective experiences. Such inputs are not subject to reason and therefore “Other things” are never equal. He then creates a classification of reasons to believe into “epistemic reasons,” reasons that make the doctrines likely, and “beneficial reasons,” reasons that benefit the believer. He in turn creates two categories from the beneficial reasons, “moral” and “prudential.” He also considers interpretation of the answers either broadly, which includes all the reasons, or narrowly, which includes only epistemic reasons.
At this point we begin to see the outlines of his approach. The next sentence reads, “There is a strong presumption that one should believe Christian doctrines only on epistemic reasons.” He references his own prior book, Atheism: a Philosophical Justification to support the claim. Considering that epistemic grounds are those which can be demonstrated or supported with objective evidence, he has immediately created a bias in the rule set that eliminates any considerations other than physically evidential. If one buys that condition of the argument one has essentially ceded the battle before it starts. When he couples that with a demand for literal interpretation of creed and scripture, it is easy for him to claim that Christianity fails to be reasonable by his criteria. He waxes on in the paragraph about the unstated dangers of believing Christian doctrine on insufficient evidence. This begs the question: “Insufficient by whose standards?” He also makes a point of the possibility of being epistemologically irresponsible, which sounds good but has no useful meaning, unless one takes the time to define what is “epistemological responsibility.”
At this point he concludes: “…there is both a moral duty and an epistemic duty not to believe in Christian doctrines unless there are good epistemic reasons to believe them. It is indeed a strange view of belief that thinks it is totally subject to duty and reason. Like most fundamental parts of a person’s being, beliefs are built up from far more than just reason and physical evidence. Generally, in this author’s experience, belief is changed only by major experiential events or prolonged intellectual struggle, not some facile discussion of epistemic evidence.
He next discusses beneficial reasons. He states that beneficial reasons might be used when the epistemic evidence is even, i.e. as a tie-breaker. He also says that it is allowable for belief for beneficial reasons if the epistemic evidence is inadequate or, in very special instances when it goes against belief. His justification, however, for this approach is utilitarian, saying that the belief from beneficial reasons will result in benefits and not result in “long-term adverse effects on society, its institutions, and human personality and character.” He presents a couple of rather far-fetched examples of possible beneficial reasons to believe. He is attempting to make the decision to believe one of utilitarian choice, and finally states that there are no reasons to accept a Christian God over any other supernatural being, and that personal happiness is a decision based on individual background. It is interesting that in his discussion of beneficial reasons, he mentions Pascal and William James as having made beneficial arguments, but he simply dismisses them. The fact is that other than his straw men, he does not deal with any of the theological discussions over the ages concerning beneficial reasons to believe. It is a case of silence and tip-toeing by.
He then asks, “Cannot Christian doctrines be based on faith? “ He then looks at the discussions of faith by Thomas Aquinas, Søren Kierkegaard, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He uses them as stalking horses, considering them as representative of their type of faith arguments and states that if he finds problems with these then there will be problems with discussions that are similar. Of course he ignores the possibility that there might be discussions that are not based on the same ideas as these three.
I have not read Thomas Aquinas and therefore cannot judge the accuracy or the fairness of his summary of Aquinas’ arguments. Professor Martin states that Aquinas uses the existence of miracles the success of the Christian church, and the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy as evidence of the truth of Christian doctrine. He then proceeds to state that these are not adequate supports. Though I would have liked to see more of why he considers miracles a problem, in a generic sense I agree with that statement. His saying other religions are successful by the same criteria is true today, but in Aquinas time, the Roman Catholic church was the only major church. His disputing the Biblical Prophecies by pointing out the failure of the Second Coming, is to revert to Biblical literalism. On this last issue, even by Aquinas’ time it was being interpreted as symbolic rather than literal. The problem is that Professor Martin is disputing a thirteenth century discussion using modern perspectives. That is similar to arguing that a flintlock muzzle-loader is ineffective and useless because there are now automatic rifles. At the time the flintlock was used it was effective. It is the same for Aquinas. There have been many more modern discussions of faith since then, and many of them could be considered “traditional.”
The choice of Kierkegaard for faith is to choose one of the extremes of justification of faith. According to Professor Martin, Kierkegaard argues that a total commitment to a Christian God is necessary even in the face of all contrary evidence, that a belief in God is not justified by reason. Furthermore, Dr. Martin then identifies a Kierkegaardian faith as fanaticism, and discusses the dangers of fanaticism. Dr. Martin then states, “We know from history the incalculable harm that can be done by fanaticism,” and continues with a build-up of the evils of fanaticism. He then condemns Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as a vice not a virtue because he has equated it to fanaticism. At this point he has made several errors. First, he thinks that it is dangerous to be guided by blind, passionate faith. I would argue that it depends on what the guidance is. The example he uses is Abraham being willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac. That may have seemed dangerous for Isaac, but for Abraham, it would have risked an even greater danger. Professor Martin cannot have his cake and eat it too. If we are going to use utilitarian ethics to judge then don’t suddenly use absolutes of judgment. The discussion of the evils of fanaticism are out of place in the discussion of faith by Kierkegaard. Professor Martin has greatly oversimplified and then caricatured it as fanaticism.
I see no constructive reason why the author chose Wittgenstein as the third exemplar of faith. I know of no Christian doctrine or discussion that is based on Wittgenstein, and from Dr. Martin’s discussion it would not occur. All religions believe in words as common to all of humanity, not as special constructs for their own use. If Dr. Martin’s summary is accurate, Wittgenstein is a retreat from meaning to meaningless internal analysis. Professor Martin and I agree in his last paragraph in this section: “…Christian and non-Christian are really disagreeing and that there is a common language and common categories.” However, we disagree in what he has accomplished. He thinks he has undermined faith as a reason for believing in Christian doctrine. I think he has failed in this task because he chose an outdated discussion of faith, a caricature of faith, and a meaningless view of faith as his exemplars, and having disposed of them generalized it to all of Christian faith, a error.
Now he turns to Christian doctrines as basic beliefs. Using the ideas from the foundational approach to epistemology, one states there are beliefs that are accepted as is and not justified by other beliefs to avoid infinite regress or vicious circularity. Dr. Martin points out that foundational epistemology originally related to simple mathematical and logical statements and to sense experiences. He then discusses the extensions of foundational epistemology to belief in God according Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga supposedly holds that a belief in God is properly basic, i.e. the same as the foundational statements “2+2=4” or “a thing is one thing or not one thing but not both.” However, apparently Plantigna continues by saying that even though it is basic it has grounds for belief. Professor Martin considers this an error and from there to a description of what he considers the problems with Plantigna’s formulation. Finally, he states that Plantigna 1) violates the spirit and intention of foundationalism, 2) claims that no belief can become a basic belief, 3) it makes it too easy for a belief to be considered rational, and 4) that all Christians hold common beliefs that are basic and that they agree on the conditions that make them so. The validity of his arguments is tied up in both his reading of Plantigna and foundational epistemology, neither of which I can comment on. However, his fifth observation is that a belief in God is not appropriate for inclusion in the class of basic beliefs. This I strongly disagree with. To believe in God or not believe in God, i.e. believe in no-God, is of necessity the first choice. It is foundational. Once that decision has been made, everything else is justification for that belief. His discussion is fairly effective in disputing Plantigna on a belief in God as a basic belief. However, I think he has cherry-picked the philosopher he disputes for his particularly weak presentation.
I seriously doubt that Alvin Plantigna is the only religious philosopher to discuss belief, and to take Plantigna, a single example, and then consider the defeat of his arguments as defeating the entire concept of Christian doctrine as belief is analogous to taking out a Sergeant of a company and consider one has defeated the company. His goal in this chapter is to force the discussion of Christianity into a discussion of the epistemological basis of Christian doctrine. For atheists, myself included when I was an atheist, this is the easiest ground upon which to criticize Christian doctrine. However, that does not make it a slam-dunk. To base the entire case against Christianity solely on it epistemology is to ignore most of what religions are about. They are not solely about facts and logic but also the meaning of those facts, and the further implications when allied with personal subjective experience, and testimony of those one wishes to believe.
This essay will deal with the next Chapter in some detail since it concerns itself with the historical Jesus. Since the existence of Jesus is fundamental to Christianity, Dr. Martin’s treatment of the subject is important. This is an area in which I have done some study, so am slightly familiar with the literature and the scholars in the field.
Chapter 2, “The Historicity of Jesus,” begins with a very cursory overview designed to lead to the question, “Did Jesus really exist?” To quote the final paragraph of this peroration: “This chapter, then, considers the question of whether there is reliable historical evidence for the assumption for the historicity of Jesus. It will also ask if there is any historical evidence against this assumption.” To do this he draws primarily on one author, G. A. Wells, and does not discuss any work of the main scholars in the search for the historical Jesus (A review of the current activity in the field lists 19.) A reading of the end notes reveals a preponderance of titles indicating disbelief in the existence of Jesus. Considering that Gert Theissen and Annette Mertz published a major book (The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide, Fortress Press, 1998) that was a guide to the literature on the historical Jesus and contained hundreds, if not close to or over a thousand references to the literature, Dr. Martin can hardly claim to have properly researched the topic. From my reading to date, there is much judgment in evaluating the evidence, and I think that Dr. Martin cannot claim any kind of impartiality here.
On with the review. Dr Martin opens the main thrust of his arguments with the common observations concerning the difficulties verifying independently the stories of Jesus in the Gospels. He generalizes the issue by saying, “Skepticism about the details of Jesus’ life can generate skepticism about his very existence.” He then claims that the most respected contemporary critique of the life of Jesus is G. A. Wells. He claims he is well known, and that his position is singled out by apologists for the historical Jesus. (A survey of the literature in my library, including authors that do not favor the current interpretations of Jesus’ life, do not list G. A. Wells as a source, despite Dr. Martin’s claim.)
Regardless of his esteem or lack of it, one still has to look at Well’s argument on its own merits. A proper presentation of Well’s argument is beyond the scope of this essay. It consists primarily of pointing to the Gospels as inadequate historical documents, Paul’s lack of mention of the details of Jesus’ life, the theological goals of the Gospels, the inadequacies of secular confirmation of the events in Jesus’ life, the inability to state dates accurately, and some reasoning on the sequence of appearance of certain narratives in the post-Gospel literature. Wells then concludes that Jesus was actually a myth based on the Jewish Wisdom literature. However, as one reads this summary, one finds that Wells exercises considerable judgment on what is and is not adequate evidence or mention of Jesus.
In discussing the criticisms of Wells, Dr. Martin quotes men that are not part of the mainline historical Jesus scholarship. He thus can be accused of trying to win his point by deliberately skewing the evidence. This area is so complex and difficult, that to try to treat it in a single chapter of 36 pages is not realistic. Based on the selection of scholars, the conclusion was foregone. Because of his own position and the goal he is trying to attain, Dr. Martin gives high credibility to skeptical positions and low credibility to affirmative positions on the existence of Jesus. Since there are figures in history from about the same time that are considered real on the basis of equivalent or even less information, it would appear that for Dr. Martin the stringency of proof for the life of Jesus’ is higher than for others.
The chapters on the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth and Second Coming, and The Incarnation deal with material that can be widely interpreted among Christians. Dr. Martin consistently requires a literal reading when referring to the Gospel stories, which literal reading is easily disputed and defeated. He uses his apparent destruction of a preceding doctrine as part of his case against the current doctrine under discussion. I am not going to discuss these chapters in any detail, as I would not present an effective discussion. I am currently working on my own formulations of the Resurrection and is sequels; I am partial to Mark, not Matthew or Luke concerning Jesus origins (unknown), I think the statements of the Second Coming has much to be discussed as to how and why they were recorded, and I do not believe in the Incarnation. However, unlike Dr. Martin, I do not consider these as reasons to discard Christianity or partial Christian belief.
I do think Dr. Martin’s discussion of Christian ethics warrants looking at in some detail. Though I don’t think it alone can make a case against Christianity, it does reveal some interesting overlaps between Christian and secular ethics.
Dr. Martin considers Jesus’ ethical teachings and example as essential to the case against Christianity. He also considers them important in substantiating the Incarnation. I directly disagree with this last statement. If Jesus’ behavior is to be emulated, to validate it by appealing to the Incarnation is to provide what I call the Divine Cop-out—how could we possibly be as good as Jesus, since he was divine? For Jesus to provide an example of proper human behavior, that behavior must come from someone who is completely and absolutely human while acting. Any other interpretation is to require behavior that is not possible for humans. From my point of view, Incarnation and Jesus example as a human are not related. Dr. Martin does consider the emulation of Jesus’ teachings and behavior as part of being a Christian, even the most liberal type of Christian, and in that I would agree.
The second paragraph of this chapter is a minefield full questions that can only be answered subjectively:
His second sentence is a massive understatement. What Jesus said and what he meant by what he said is an active and controversial field today. Dr. Martin can only make his own evaluation of the issue, not a complete and overarching one that would allow him to make a clear pronouncement on Christian ethics. So from the start we have to take the position that he is discussing HIS interpretation of Jesus teachings. Dr. Martin makes a common mistake in the next sentence, the Gospels are not Jesus’ gospels, they are about Jesus not by him. This is a nit in one sense, but possibly important in how he deals with them. We must always keep in mind that the Gospels are what their authors wanted us to know about Jesus, and as such are not true biographies. Their purpose is to teach religious truth, not historical truth. The next four questions are completely open to subjective judgment—workable by what standard, what is meant by “a sensitive moral observer”, what is “an ideal moral model,” and what is meant by “a sensitive moral person?” The last two sentences actually have valid grounds for discussion, and a program of comparing the understanding of Christian ethicists to that of secular ethicists would be a topic for a major book in itself. I don’t doubt that there have been such books written. The one caveat that we must keep in mind for such a discussion is who are the Christian ethicists and who are the secular ethicists? One must be either very comprehensive or at least representative or the discussion becomes simply the comparison of two ethicists to one another, not a general comparison of Christian to secular ethics.
One of the major themes in the discussion of the historicity of Jesus, was that Paul and the Epistles, several of which were written prior to the Gospels do not quote Jesus’ teachings, even when in Dr. Martin’s opinion, it would be to the advantage of the writer to do so. He uses this a presumptive evidence that Jesus’ teachings were actually made up after the fact. This is a naïve representation of the issue, as the purpose of the Epistles was quite different from the purposes of the gospels. The analogy would be the Epistles are to the Gospels, as administrative letters are to the papers of incorporation of a company. The former does not necessarily need to quote the latter in performing their purpose. We must also remember that we do not know the complete context of any of the Epistles or the Gospels other than their internal content and the times in which they were written. There is far more room for selective interpretation than Dr. Martin would have us believe. However, Dr. Martin uses this argument to immediately cast doubt on Jesus’ teachings as being those of Jesus. He then chooses to continue his discussion as if the teachings as related in the Synoptic Gospels were the teachings of Jesus.
In developing his interpretation of Christian ethics, he acknowledges indebtedness to the following: An Atheist’s Values, by Richard Robinson, Atheism: The Case Against God, by George H. Smith, and “Why I am not a Christian” in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, by Bertrand Russell. From the start he is using an interpretation from three atheists, not even his own interpretation. Immediately one wants to question whether he has read the Gospels himself or is simply taking someone else’s word for it. The remainder of the section quotes some of the most contentious and difficult of the Gospel verses—the so-called “hard verses”—because of the difficulty of preaching on them when taken literally. This, of course, is exactly what Dr. Martin wants to do, regardless of whether this is indeed what is commonly done in Christian churches. What follows is the playing of verses from one Gospel against another, without regard to any of the higher criticism that has occurred over the last one hundred years. This is the same kind of sophistry that Shelby Spong exhibited in one of his books, showing that literal interpretation of the Bible is contradictory. This is not news to any person educated in Christianity. This is where much of the intellectual work of biblical scholars, atheist, agnostic, and theist, has gone over the past hundred and fifty years.
When Dr. Martin discusses Jesus’ life as an example of his ethical teachings, he is selective in what he chooses and plays off the gentleness in Luke against the more judgmental stories in Matthew and Mark. He also accuses Jesus of anti-intellectuality because of his teachings that say to be as children, and to believe what he said. This ignores much of what Jesus said and did at other times, and definitely ignores the context of his teaching. One of the interpretations of his teachings is that he was working against the legalism of the Pharisees to get back to the spirit of the Law, not its absolute behavioral proscriptions. What comes out of the selections of Jesus behavior is more a caricature than a picture of him. His teachings are also evaluated by modern criteria rather than by the times in which he taught. Again, this time implicitly rather than explicitly, Dr. Martin is depending on a literal rather than a metaphorical or allegorical reading of the scripture. Such literalism is confined to only a subset of Christianity. In using a literal interpretation, he makes charges of unrealism and anti-intellectualism.
The section on “What Jesus’ Practices and Teachings Neglect” again depends on literalism in interpretation. Here is the opening of the section:
Dr. Martin then continues stating that it is not clear what can be deduced from his sayings and activities. He tries to show that Jesus was inconsistent on the subject of poverty, and also condemns him for not explicitly condemning slavery. Such simplistic analyses do not belong in a serious book. These areas have been the subject of much comment and study over hundreds of years. When one considers that the evangelists that wrote the Gospels were selecting material to present their interpretation of Jesus and his teachings, and that they also had to work within a highly censorious atmosphere socially, not all topics would necessarily be quoted. Also slavery in Roman times varied in its causes and the way it was carried out. In fact, some slavery was voluntary. Our modern image of slavery did not necessarily fit the reality of Roman times in many cases. So not only has Dr. Martin depended on a literalism that is inappropriate, he also fails to consider the overall context of Jesus’ times vs. ours.
In the next section of this chapter, “Evaluation of Jesus’ Ethics,” Dr. Martin discusses specific “commandments” that form what he considers Jesus’ ethics. These “commandments” are a formulation by Richard Robinson, in his book, An Atheist’s Values The first is what he terms the Love of God and Faith in Jesus commandments. To quote the first paragraph:
He dismisses what he terms the Faith in Jesus Commandment by saying that it depends on the truth of the Incarnation, which he considers to already be destroyed by his discussion of it. This so-called commandment is based on an interpretation of Luke, and is also heavily dependent on the translation being used to justify it. It concerns the belief that Jesus was the actual son of God and that he claimed to be the Messiah.
The next “commandment” is labeled the Purity of Heart and Language Commandment. This is not a direct commandment but is a synthesis by Robinson from the verses in Matthew 5:21-36. Dr. Martin then goes on to discuss how these are in conflict with modern psychology, leading to harmful repression, followed by a discussion in which he points out that following certain lines of thought can indeed be harmful. He then attempts to argue that modern discussion is based on consequences but that is not what Jesus was saying, that Jesus was arguing the thoughts were harmful in themselves. Dr. Martin appears to be following someone else’s discussion and has not created his own from direct reading. The discussion of this section is inconclusive, and actually is one of the more honest sections in the book.
The Commandment of Humility is also synthesized from sayings in the Synoptic Gospels concerning giving and praying in secret, and serving others. Dr. Martin tries to first show that taken to the extreme, being totally retiring can be foolish, using a crisis example. He also tries to say that public giving may be altruistic, that it depends on motive. He also takes the extreme position of not judging others to show it is also unrealistic. He considers it unclear if a less extreme position is what Jesus meant.
At this point, the discussion of Jesus’ ethics is based on another atheist’s synthesis of the commandments from the Synoptic gospels. It also appears to be based on an absolute literalism and an ignoring of both social, Biblical, and temporal contexts. To this point, Dr. Martin almost appears to want his cake and eat it too. He admits that few modern Christians accept the harsh literal interpretation he is condemning, yet still makes the effort to condemn it. It is almost as if he desperately need to score every negative point he can.
The remainder and bulk of the chapter is spent on a discussion of the Love Your Neighbor Commandment. Here is his opening paragraph:
Dr. Martin considers Paul Ramsey’s Basic Christian Ethics to be “[o]ne of the clearest and most thoughtful interpretations of contemporary Christian ethics.” From the extensive quotes and discussion presenting Ramsey’s views, Ramsey interprets the scripture concerning loving ones neighbors as having an apocalyptic basis, but that basis is not necessary for them to be valid today. One of the points Dr. Martin makes is the dropping of the hellfire and damnation and vengefulness portions (as Dr. Martin sees them) from Jesus’ teachings. The emphasis is on Jesus mercy and kindness. Dr. Martin then says:
But Dr. Martin’s payoff in choosing Paul Ramsey is that Ramsey preaches total non-resistance to anything, not even non-violent resistance. Dr. Martin then pounces on this to show that Ramsey is unjustified in his self-defense position and that his discussion of utilitarianism adds nothing to the criticisms of utilitarianism. He also points out that a justice principle might be an adequate substitute for the love of neighbor. To a secularist this may seem plausible, but not to a Christian. There is depth and implications to loving ones neighbor as oneself that go beyond a simple principle of justice. Dr. Martin also points out that ignoring indirect consequences can be harmful even if one is exactly following the principle of loving ones neighbor as oneself. He of course resorts to an extreme example, but then he has also selected an extreme example of an ethicist to discuss in the first place.
Dr. Martin’s discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr interprets Niebuhr as saying that Jesus preached an impossible ethical ideal that nonetheless has validity today as a guide to our own day-to-day ethical behavior. Niebuhr is taken as thinking that “we cannot live up to the ethical ideal of Jesus because of our human nature.” There is further explication on Niebuhr’s themes, and much of it appears fair. Martin then points out. “Although Niebuhr ties his ethical view closely to Christian religious doctrines there is no a priori reason to do so. Thus a non-Christian and even a secularist could maintain that although the ethics of Jesus is an impossible ideal, it nevertheless provides insights abut and serves as a source of criticisms of actual ethical systems.” He expands on this idea showing how a secularist might find the same ideals but with different justification.
Then Dr. Martin suddenly shifts to his belief system.
Dr. Martin then considers that Niebuhr’s description of what the law of love amounts to as inadequate and providing clearly what it entails. On those grounds he rejects the interpretation and offers an example of having to chose whether oneself or ones neighbor dies, and the law of love providing no answer. I don’t know that any ethical system other than pure immediate self-interest does provide that answer.
The third ethicist is Gene Outka, who wrote Agape: An Ethical Analysis. Outka is shown to discuss agape as an equal regard for all humans, but a response that takes into account their needs and abilities. That despite regarding them as of equal worth, one responds and treats different people differently. Dr Martin dismisses the theological justifications for agape as being dependent on a belief in God. He does raise the idea that theological statements of is do not necessarily entail the ought of our behavior, and considers Outka to have inadequately addressed this.
Dr. Martin then briefly describes Outka’s comparisons of agape to contemporary secular ethical thinking. He then posits that there might not be any real difference between Outka’s agape and a principle of equalitarian justice combined with a principle of beneficence. His concluding discussions for this section dwell primarily on the issues of the is-ought gap, and also concludes that Outka does not generate more doubt for creating a secular version of agape than a religious one, and that the open question of how much overlap there is between secular and religious agape is not due to disagreement among philosophers but to a lack of evidence and clarity on the notion itself.
Dr. Martin then finishes the discussion of agape with the question of whether there might be times when it is moral to be selfish. He provides examples of situations where a short-term constant self-negation leads to long-term negative consequences. In this he is again taking an absolute literal extreme, which few take, as the attempt to discredit agape. He then posits that there are Christian ethicists that would not allow purely selfish action, action which does not at least indirectly carry concern for others.
He concludes the chapter with this statement:
I will not discuss the chapter on “Salvation by Faith” in any detail. Partly this is because I have my own issues with the doctrine, and partly because I do not see Dr. Martin as raising any new significant points. It does appear that in order for him to argue against salvation, he has an interpretation of an all-good God that implies there is no judgment of people if God is all-good. He also argues that if one accounts for the “scandal of particularity,” i.e. that the infidels that have no opportunity to learn of Jesus are condemned to Hell, then there is no need for salvation by faith in Jesus.
In his concluding chapter, “Christian Responses,” Dr. Martin picks a number of positions, the main one being nonliteralism. He selects Thomas Boslooper, Rudolf Bultmann, and Richard Braithwaite as his exemplars of nonliteral interpretation. The problem is, as Dr. Martin points out, once one rejects literalism, the field is wide open to an infinitude of interpretations. What he has selected are some of the easier ideas to reject. He also makes brief mention of other Christian responses. The commentary on those is based on his earlier arguments in the book.
His concluding paragraph is of importance:
I disagree with his statement that it would be more rational to reject rather than to salvage it. Religion does more than provide a system of ethics and belief. It motivates social interaction and individual well-being. People appear to have an innate need to believe in something. In Dr. Martin’s case it would appear to be “rationality,” which he then uses to justify his belief in no-God, just as Christian scholars justify their belief in God. It is a sad commentary, however, that there are people of both types that feel they are justified in trying to force their views on the rest. What Dr. Martin fails to understand is that there is no value to educating non-questioning Christians about the problems with Christianity, as he sees them. He may have the time, energy, and ability to ask and analyze such questions, but most people do not. Even if they have the ability, they have neither the interest nor the time. Their religious beliefs are incorporated in their lives and form part of a behavioral “shorthand” when making judgments. This is of great value in day to day living. Though I question my religion deeply, I do not find other peoples beliefs regrettable. That they do not agree with me is perfectly fine. I don’t have a monopoly on the correct answers, and truth to tell, neither does Dr. Martin. His view of “1.6 billion Christians” is really quite arrogant.
This book is similar to other books of its type. It does everything it can to destroy Christianity, but fails to provide anything in its place. Overall, by the standards of what I have been reading for the past couple of years or more, this is really quite amateurish. It is a long version of much that I wrote when an undergraduate first becoming an atheist. It has an absolute dependence on literal interpretation of the scriptures, which in turn has a heavy dependence on the translation from which the words are taken. I don’t think Professor Martin would stand a chance in a discussion with a Jesuit, or many of the well-known Christian philosophers and theologians. That I, in my modest state of knowledge, could find it so easy to dispute his writing, is in itself a harsh critique of its quality. What we have here is Atheist Fundamentalism, a warping of the religious intellectual landscape to support his anti-Christian, atheistic belief structure, just as the religious Fundamentalist Christians warp the scientific intellectual landscape to support their beliefs.
Were it not for the current atmosphere of hostility to Judeo-Christian belief in our society, this book could be ignored. Considering that it is twenty years old and little or no mention has been made of it, that I have seen, it has been ignored. However, it is also an example of the kind of argumentation that can have persuasiveness to wannabe intellectuals, who read it as support of their adoption of atheism, without the knowledge to evaluate it uncritically. (Even those who should be critical apparently aren’t, given their support on the back cover.) Apparently being an Atheist, as opposed to an atheist, blinds one to ones own illogic and poor argumentation, just as Fundamentalism blinds one to the current status of science and scholarly religious discourse. This review is presented to make an object lesson of this book in how not to argue religious questions.
From the first, Professor Martin engages in the use of sweeping generalization of history, dismissing the first few hundred years of debate over what constitutes the correct Christian doctrines as a massive suppression of dissent by the church. He also sees the rise of Biblical Criticism and emergence of Science in the Nineteenth Century as an attack on Christian doctrine not as an attempt better understand the world. An in-depth study of both of these periods would show it to be much more complex than that.
At this point he justifies his book and presents us with these two paragraphs:
“Although some nineteenth- and twentieth-century criticisms of Christianity deserve praise for raising important critical questions and for continuing the work of the earlier critics, an adequate, systematic, philosophical critique has yet to be produced. The purpose of this work is to present such a criticism. Although I have elsewhere argued at length for atheism, this view will not be presupposed in what follows. Indeed, a reader can believe in God and accept everything in this book without being inconsistent.
“My object in presenting the case against Christianity is theoretical, not practical. I am not so naïve as to suppose that the arguments set forth here will induce many people to give up their Christian beliefs. My claim is simply that in the light of my discussion rational people should give up these beliefs.”
The claims being made here are breath-taking in their sweep and scope. First is his claim that the book is an “adequate, systematic, philosophical critique.” Second is that it is the first such critique. The third is that his discussion is correct and rational, and finally that his rationality of argument is sufficient to cause a reversal of belief. If one looks at the footnotes, his reputed critical sources are pamphleteers from the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries. There are no sources from the work of Higher Criticism that arose at that time. He places himself among poor competition from the start. But worse is his complete ignorance or active ignoring of the centuries of debate that started in the Seventeenth Century over Christian doctrine and its applicability. He is definitely not the first systematic critic. His last sentence is what is so wonderfully arrogant. Restated he says, “I am right and therefore you should change your beliefs. To not do so is to be irrational.” Rationality is based on premises that are given not proven. His premises have to be as convincing as those he is trying to replace, and the logic must flow without choices from those premises. Essentially he is making a claim to infallibility, since he creates an imperative statement.
He next establishes what he will call Christianity against which to make his case. He starts with the creeds, Apostle’s, Nicene, and Athanasian. His presentation of the creeds and their history is quite fair. He uses an obscure 1877 book by Phillip Schaff, who Professor Martin describes as a scholar of the creeds, to support his claim that they are accepted and provide a description of their purposes in mainline churches. In my mind this is pseudo-scholarship. The fact that the three creeds are in prayer books and hymnals and used at services in almost all Christian churches is sufficient. He is simply trying to create a gloss of scholarship on his writing here. He then compares and discusses the various beliefs stated in the creeds and from that creates definitions of the beliefs of a “Basic Christian,” a “Liberal Christian,” and an “Orthodox Christian.”
It is in creating his definitions that he uses a stylistic device that is apparently an attempt to create the impression of deep analysis. He uses formal logic to create the definitions. Example:
“Person P is a Basic Christian if and only if P believes that …..”
Or
“Person P is an Orthodox Christian if and only if P is a Basic Christian and P believes…..”
This type of formality is only used here and in one or two other places. Yet nowhere does the reasoning or discussion use these formalities. I have seen the same kinds of devices in my early writing when I was trying to pretend I was very knowledgeable. Unfortunately, I suspect the same thing here. He then introduces an extra belief statement that Jesus is the model of ethical behavior. He also adds to the definition that a Christian attempts to follow the ethical teachings of Jesus.
At this point, he appears to be reasonable enough, and one can easily accept his starting premises so far. Based on what occurs in the rest of the book, one has to be very careful. He is actually setting up a bait and switch. He will define Orthodox Christianity very rigidly, add biblical literalism, attack it in detail, then claim he has made a case against Christianity, when all he has done is point out the illogic of literal reading and interpretation of the creeds and the Bible.
In the Introduction which we are still considering, he states that these articles of belief are assumptions, and then raises some questions concerning them. Here is where we see some beginnings of tilting the argument in the givens. He divides the beliefs into three groups, historical, theological, and ethical. That of itself is not an issue, it is how he sorts them that starts creating concern.
He groups the existence of Jesus, the Virgin Birth, the Crucifixion by Pilate, and the Resurrection as historical theses. He then states that historical methods are applicable to determining the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. He also makes the claim that historical research is relevant to the determination of the truth of the Second Coming, and in deciding whether Jesus was the Son of God and not a mere man. He also wants to use historical evidence in Jesus’ teachings about salvation and ethics. First of all, he is asking us to agree to the historicity of these events as determining their truth or falsity. These are articles of faith. To some degree they are based on historical events, but one does not make an argument strictly from history in these cases. Moreover, he is also making a claim that he can present a historical case for or against these. As we continue in the book, he does a poor job of it compared to the work I have seen written by true historians.
Considering that the issue of the Virgin Birth may possibly hinge on translation issues of the Koine Greek passages and on interpretation of other scripture, which is contentious in itself, it is hard to believe that historical analysis can provide light here. There have been many previous discussions of the Virgin Birth, and my former pastor said, “My belief is not based on the state of Mary’s hymen.” Of course this puts him outside the author’s definition of an Orthodox Christian, which, as we shall see, is what he is attacking. So the Virgin Birth is as important to our author’s case as it may be to some Christians. The literal Virgin Birth is essential to his case.
The Resurrection is still another issue that does not seem readily amenable to historical methods. The empty tomb may well be in the domain of history, but the explanations may not. The appearances of Jesus after death may be questioned, but ultimately one has not a definitive acceptance or rejection by logic and analysis, but a decision based on one’s own evaluation of the evidence for and against. It is a “fuzzy logic” decision. As for the Second Coming, it is a prediction not a historical event. What we shall see is that he wants to use the absolute, literal statements on when the Second Coming will occur to discredit it.
We shall leave the use of history to decide if Jesus was the Son of God and Jesus’ teachings until the author discusses them.
He then states that the assumptions of the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation, and salvation through faith in Jesus raise theological issues as well. He asks some example questions, some of which are immediately not literally true, and some of which have engaged theologians for centuries. He also questions whether Jesus’ ethical views are plausible and if they should be a model of ethical behavior.
The remainder of the Introduction lays out the overall approach of the book. He also mentions that he has two appendices on Divine Command theory of ethics and theories of Atonement. I am not sure why he includes these since he admits that Divine Command theory of ethics is not part of his definition of Christianity, and theory of Atonement is not part of any of the creeds.
This is an ambitious program, requiring the abilities of a historian, a theologian, and an ethicist. People have made a lifetime career of discussion one of the issues he raises, and he is going to cover them all. And, as we shall see, he believes that if one destroys these beliefs by the use of logic one must have destroyed a belief in Christianity or else be deemed irrational. What he forgets is that failure to prove is not disproof. He also is extremely dependent on a rigid, literal interpretation of the Bible, a view that is in the minority of Christianity today.
In the first chapter of the book, “The Basis of Christian Belief,” he asks the question, “Under what conditions should one believe Christian doctrines?” This is the first step in creating a tilted playing field for the discussion. He is assuming that belief is conditional, and that people arrive at belief via reason. For he then answers his question, “Surely the answer that recommends itself to reason and common sense is: Other things being equal, one should believe them only if there are good reasons to do so.” Of course his goal is to show there are no good reasons to do so. What is totally ignored is that religious issues are not decided solely on the basis of reason. They are more often decided on the basis of emotional perception and subjective experiences. Such inputs are not subject to reason and therefore “Other things” are never equal. He then creates a classification of reasons to believe into “epistemic reasons,” reasons that make the doctrines likely, and “beneficial reasons,” reasons that benefit the believer. He in turn creates two categories from the beneficial reasons, “moral” and “prudential.” He also considers interpretation of the answers either broadly, which includes all the reasons, or narrowly, which includes only epistemic reasons.
At this point we begin to see the outlines of his approach. The next sentence reads, “There is a strong presumption that one should believe Christian doctrines only on epistemic reasons.” He references his own prior book, Atheism: a Philosophical Justification to support the claim. Considering that epistemic grounds are those which can be demonstrated or supported with objective evidence, he has immediately created a bias in the rule set that eliminates any considerations other than physically evidential. If one buys that condition of the argument one has essentially ceded the battle before it starts. When he couples that with a demand for literal interpretation of creed and scripture, it is easy for him to claim that Christianity fails to be reasonable by his criteria. He waxes on in the paragraph about the unstated dangers of believing Christian doctrine on insufficient evidence. This begs the question: “Insufficient by whose standards?” He also makes a point of the possibility of being epistemologically irresponsible, which sounds good but has no useful meaning, unless one takes the time to define what is “epistemological responsibility.”
At this point he concludes: “…there is both a moral duty and an epistemic duty not to believe in Christian doctrines unless there are good epistemic reasons to believe them. It is indeed a strange view of belief that thinks it is totally subject to duty and reason. Like most fundamental parts of a person’s being, beliefs are built up from far more than just reason and physical evidence. Generally, in this author’s experience, belief is changed only by major experiential events or prolonged intellectual struggle, not some facile discussion of epistemic evidence.
He next discusses beneficial reasons. He states that beneficial reasons might be used when the epistemic evidence is even, i.e. as a tie-breaker. He also says that it is allowable for belief for beneficial reasons if the epistemic evidence is inadequate or, in very special instances when it goes against belief. His justification, however, for this approach is utilitarian, saying that the belief from beneficial reasons will result in benefits and not result in “long-term adverse effects on society, its institutions, and human personality and character.” He presents a couple of rather far-fetched examples of possible beneficial reasons to believe. He is attempting to make the decision to believe one of utilitarian choice, and finally states that there are no reasons to accept a Christian God over any other supernatural being, and that personal happiness is a decision based on individual background. It is interesting that in his discussion of beneficial reasons, he mentions Pascal and William James as having made beneficial arguments, but he simply dismisses them. The fact is that other than his straw men, he does not deal with any of the theological discussions over the ages concerning beneficial reasons to believe. It is a case of silence and tip-toeing by.
He then asks, “Cannot Christian doctrines be based on faith? “ He then looks at the discussions of faith by Thomas Aquinas, Søren Kierkegaard, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He uses them as stalking horses, considering them as representative of their type of faith arguments and states that if he finds problems with these then there will be problems with discussions that are similar. Of course he ignores the possibility that there might be discussions that are not based on the same ideas as these three.
I have not read Thomas Aquinas and therefore cannot judge the accuracy or the fairness of his summary of Aquinas’ arguments. Professor Martin states that Aquinas uses the existence of miracles the success of the Christian church, and the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy as evidence of the truth of Christian doctrine. He then proceeds to state that these are not adequate supports. Though I would have liked to see more of why he considers miracles a problem, in a generic sense I agree with that statement. His saying other religions are successful by the same criteria is true today, but in Aquinas time, the Roman Catholic church was the only major church. His disputing the Biblical Prophecies by pointing out the failure of the Second Coming, is to revert to Biblical literalism. On this last issue, even by Aquinas’ time it was being interpreted as symbolic rather than literal. The problem is that Professor Martin is disputing a thirteenth century discussion using modern perspectives. That is similar to arguing that a flintlock muzzle-loader is ineffective and useless because there are now automatic rifles. At the time the flintlock was used it was effective. It is the same for Aquinas. There have been many more modern discussions of faith since then, and many of them could be considered “traditional.”
The choice of Kierkegaard for faith is to choose one of the extremes of justification of faith. According to Professor Martin, Kierkegaard argues that a total commitment to a Christian God is necessary even in the face of all contrary evidence, that a belief in God is not justified by reason. Furthermore, Dr. Martin then identifies a Kierkegaardian faith as fanaticism, and discusses the dangers of fanaticism. Dr. Martin then states, “We know from history the incalculable harm that can be done by fanaticism,” and continues with a build-up of the evils of fanaticism. He then condemns Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as a vice not a virtue because he has equated it to fanaticism. At this point he has made several errors. First, he thinks that it is dangerous to be guided by blind, passionate faith. I would argue that it depends on what the guidance is. The example he uses is Abraham being willing to sacrifice his son, Isaac. That may have seemed dangerous for Isaac, but for Abraham, it would have risked an even greater danger. Professor Martin cannot have his cake and eat it too. If we are going to use utilitarian ethics to judge then don’t suddenly use absolutes of judgment. The discussion of the evils of fanaticism are out of place in the discussion of faith by Kierkegaard. Professor Martin has greatly oversimplified and then caricatured it as fanaticism.
I see no constructive reason why the author chose Wittgenstein as the third exemplar of faith. I know of no Christian doctrine or discussion that is based on Wittgenstein, and from Dr. Martin’s discussion it would not occur. All religions believe in words as common to all of humanity, not as special constructs for their own use. If Dr. Martin’s summary is accurate, Wittgenstein is a retreat from meaning to meaningless internal analysis. Professor Martin and I agree in his last paragraph in this section: “…Christian and non-Christian are really disagreeing and that there is a common language and common categories.” However, we disagree in what he has accomplished. He thinks he has undermined faith as a reason for believing in Christian doctrine. I think he has failed in this task because he chose an outdated discussion of faith, a caricature of faith, and a meaningless view of faith as his exemplars, and having disposed of them generalized it to all of Christian faith, a error.
Now he turns to Christian doctrines as basic beliefs. Using the ideas from the foundational approach to epistemology, one states there are beliefs that are accepted as is and not justified by other beliefs to avoid infinite regress or vicious circularity. Dr. Martin points out that foundational epistemology originally related to simple mathematical and logical statements and to sense experiences. He then discusses the extensions of foundational epistemology to belief in God according Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga supposedly holds that a belief in God is properly basic, i.e. the same as the foundational statements “2+2=4” or “a thing is one thing or not one thing but not both.” However, apparently Plantigna continues by saying that even though it is basic it has grounds for belief. Professor Martin considers this an error and from there to a description of what he considers the problems with Plantigna’s formulation. Finally, he states that Plantigna 1) violates the spirit and intention of foundationalism, 2) claims that no belief can become a basic belief, 3) it makes it too easy for a belief to be considered rational, and 4) that all Christians hold common beliefs that are basic and that they agree on the conditions that make them so. The validity of his arguments is tied up in both his reading of Plantigna and foundational epistemology, neither of which I can comment on. However, his fifth observation is that a belief in God is not appropriate for inclusion in the class of basic beliefs. This I strongly disagree with. To believe in God or not believe in God, i.e. believe in no-God, is of necessity the first choice. It is foundational. Once that decision has been made, everything else is justification for that belief. His discussion is fairly effective in disputing Plantigna on a belief in God as a basic belief. However, I think he has cherry-picked the philosopher he disputes for his particularly weak presentation.
I seriously doubt that Alvin Plantigna is the only religious philosopher to discuss belief, and to take Plantigna, a single example, and then consider the defeat of his arguments as defeating the entire concept of Christian doctrine as belief is analogous to taking out a Sergeant of a company and consider one has defeated the company. His goal in this chapter is to force the discussion of Christianity into a discussion of the epistemological basis of Christian doctrine. For atheists, myself included when I was an atheist, this is the easiest ground upon which to criticize Christian doctrine. However, that does not make it a slam-dunk. To base the entire case against Christianity solely on it epistemology is to ignore most of what religions are about. They are not solely about facts and logic but also the meaning of those facts, and the further implications when allied with personal subjective experience, and testimony of those one wishes to believe.
This essay will deal with the next Chapter in some detail since it concerns itself with the historical Jesus. Since the existence of Jesus is fundamental to Christianity, Dr. Martin’s treatment of the subject is important. This is an area in which I have done some study, so am slightly familiar with the literature and the scholars in the field.
Chapter 2, “The Historicity of Jesus,” begins with a very cursory overview designed to lead to the question, “Did Jesus really exist?” To quote the final paragraph of this peroration: “This chapter, then, considers the question of whether there is reliable historical evidence for the assumption for the historicity of Jesus. It will also ask if there is any historical evidence against this assumption.” To do this he draws primarily on one author, G. A. Wells, and does not discuss any work of the main scholars in the search for the historical Jesus (A review of the current activity in the field lists 19.) A reading of the end notes reveals a preponderance of titles indicating disbelief in the existence of Jesus. Considering that Gert Theissen and Annette Mertz published a major book (The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide, Fortress Press, 1998) that was a guide to the literature on the historical Jesus and contained hundreds, if not close to or over a thousand references to the literature, Dr. Martin can hardly claim to have properly researched the topic. From my reading to date, there is much judgment in evaluating the evidence, and I think that Dr. Martin cannot claim any kind of impartiality here.
On with the review. Dr Martin opens the main thrust of his arguments with the common observations concerning the difficulties verifying independently the stories of Jesus in the Gospels. He generalizes the issue by saying, “Skepticism about the details of Jesus’ life can generate skepticism about his very existence.” He then claims that the most respected contemporary critique of the life of Jesus is G. A. Wells. He claims he is well known, and that his position is singled out by apologists for the historical Jesus. (A survey of the literature in my library, including authors that do not favor the current interpretations of Jesus’ life, do not list G. A. Wells as a source, despite Dr. Martin’s claim.)
Regardless of his esteem or lack of it, one still has to look at Well’s argument on its own merits. A proper presentation of Well’s argument is beyond the scope of this essay. It consists primarily of pointing to the Gospels as inadequate historical documents, Paul’s lack of mention of the details of Jesus’ life, the theological goals of the Gospels, the inadequacies of secular confirmation of the events in Jesus’ life, the inability to state dates accurately, and some reasoning on the sequence of appearance of certain narratives in the post-Gospel literature. Wells then concludes that Jesus was actually a myth based on the Jewish Wisdom literature. However, as one reads this summary, one finds that Wells exercises considerable judgment on what is and is not adequate evidence or mention of Jesus.
In discussing the criticisms of Wells, Dr. Martin quotes men that are not part of the mainline historical Jesus scholarship. He thus can be accused of trying to win his point by deliberately skewing the evidence. This area is so complex and difficult, that to try to treat it in a single chapter of 36 pages is not realistic. Based on the selection of scholars, the conclusion was foregone. Because of his own position and the goal he is trying to attain, Dr. Martin gives high credibility to skeptical positions and low credibility to affirmative positions on the existence of Jesus. Since there are figures in history from about the same time that are considered real on the basis of equivalent or even less information, it would appear that for Dr. Martin the stringency of proof for the life of Jesus’ is higher than for others.
The chapters on the Resurrection, the Virgin Birth and Second Coming, and The Incarnation deal with material that can be widely interpreted among Christians. Dr. Martin consistently requires a literal reading when referring to the Gospel stories, which literal reading is easily disputed and defeated. He uses his apparent destruction of a preceding doctrine as part of his case against the current doctrine under discussion. I am not going to discuss these chapters in any detail, as I would not present an effective discussion. I am currently working on my own formulations of the Resurrection and is sequels; I am partial to Mark, not Matthew or Luke concerning Jesus origins (unknown), I think the statements of the Second Coming has much to be discussed as to how and why they were recorded, and I do not believe in the Incarnation. However, unlike Dr. Martin, I do not consider these as reasons to discard Christianity or partial Christian belief.
I do think Dr. Martin’s discussion of Christian ethics warrants looking at in some detail. Though I don’t think it alone can make a case against Christianity, it does reveal some interesting overlaps between Christian and secular ethics.
Dr. Martin considers Jesus’ ethical teachings and example as essential to the case against Christianity. He also considers them important in substantiating the Incarnation. I directly disagree with this last statement. If Jesus’ behavior is to be emulated, to validate it by appealing to the Incarnation is to provide what I call the Divine Cop-out—how could we possibly be as good as Jesus, since he was divine? For Jesus to provide an example of proper human behavior, that behavior must come from someone who is completely and absolutely human while acting. Any other interpretation is to require behavior that is not possible for humans. From my point of view, Incarnation and Jesus example as a human are not related. Dr. Martin does consider the emulation of Jesus’ teachings and behavior as part of being a Christian, even the most liberal type of Christian, and in that I would agree.
The second paragraph of this chapter is a minefield full questions that can only be answered subjectively:
”Our first job is to try to become clear on what Jesus’ teachings were. As we shall see, this is not as easy as it may seem. Once we have some idea of Jesus’ ethics we must consider his gospel impartially and ask: Do Jesus’ teachings provide a workable ethics? Would a sensitive moral observer agree with what he taught? Was Jesus an ideal moral model? Would a sensitive moral person do what Jesus did? In addition, we must ask how Christian ethicists have interpreted Jesus’ saying. In so doing we must determine how Christian ethics differ from plausible systems of secular ethics and if Christian ethics have clear advantages over these secular systems.
His second sentence is a massive understatement. What Jesus said and what he meant by what he said is an active and controversial field today. Dr. Martin can only make his own evaluation of the issue, not a complete and overarching one that would allow him to make a clear pronouncement on Christian ethics. So from the start we have to take the position that he is discussing HIS interpretation of Jesus teachings. Dr. Martin makes a common mistake in the next sentence, the Gospels are not Jesus’ gospels, they are about Jesus not by him. This is a nit in one sense, but possibly important in how he deals with them. We must always keep in mind that the Gospels are what their authors wanted us to know about Jesus, and as such are not true biographies. Their purpose is to teach religious truth, not historical truth. The next four questions are completely open to subjective judgment—workable by what standard, what is meant by “a sensitive moral observer”, what is “an ideal moral model,” and what is meant by “a sensitive moral person?” The last two sentences actually have valid grounds for discussion, and a program of comparing the understanding of Christian ethicists to that of secular ethicists would be a topic for a major book in itself. I don’t doubt that there have been such books written. The one caveat that we must keep in mind for such a discussion is who are the Christian ethicists and who are the secular ethicists? One must be either very comprehensive or at least representative or the discussion becomes simply the comparison of two ethicists to one another, not a general comparison of Christian to secular ethics.
One of the major themes in the discussion of the historicity of Jesus, was that Paul and the Epistles, several of which were written prior to the Gospels do not quote Jesus’ teachings, even when in Dr. Martin’s opinion, it would be to the advantage of the writer to do so. He uses this a presumptive evidence that Jesus’ teachings were actually made up after the fact. This is a naïve representation of the issue, as the purpose of the Epistles was quite different from the purposes of the gospels. The analogy would be the Epistles are to the Gospels, as administrative letters are to the papers of incorporation of a company. The former does not necessarily need to quote the latter in performing their purpose. We must also remember that we do not know the complete context of any of the Epistles or the Gospels other than their internal content and the times in which they were written. There is far more room for selective interpretation than Dr. Martin would have us believe. However, Dr. Martin uses this argument to immediately cast doubt on Jesus’ teachings as being those of Jesus. He then chooses to continue his discussion as if the teachings as related in the Synoptic Gospels were the teachings of Jesus.
In developing his interpretation of Christian ethics, he acknowledges indebtedness to the following: An Atheist’s Values, by Richard Robinson, Atheism: The Case Against God, by George H. Smith, and “Why I am not a Christian” in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, by Bertrand Russell. From the start he is using an interpretation from three atheists, not even his own interpretation. Immediately one wants to question whether he has read the Gospels himself or is simply taking someone else’s word for it. The remainder of the section quotes some of the most contentious and difficult of the Gospel verses—the so-called “hard verses”—because of the difficulty of preaching on them when taken literally. This, of course, is exactly what Dr. Martin wants to do, regardless of whether this is indeed what is commonly done in Christian churches. What follows is the playing of verses from one Gospel against another, without regard to any of the higher criticism that has occurred over the last one hundred years. This is the same kind of sophistry that Shelby Spong exhibited in one of his books, showing that literal interpretation of the Bible is contradictory. This is not news to any person educated in Christianity. This is where much of the intellectual work of biblical scholars, atheist, agnostic, and theist, has gone over the past hundred and fifty years.
When Dr. Martin discusses Jesus’ life as an example of his ethical teachings, he is selective in what he chooses and plays off the gentleness in Luke against the more judgmental stories in Matthew and Mark. He also accuses Jesus of anti-intellectuality because of his teachings that say to be as children, and to believe what he said. This ignores much of what Jesus said and did at other times, and definitely ignores the context of his teaching. One of the interpretations of his teachings is that he was working against the legalism of the Pharisees to get back to the spirit of the Law, not its absolute behavioral proscriptions. What comes out of the selections of Jesus behavior is more a caricature than a picture of him. His teachings are also evaluated by modern criteria rather than by the times in which he taught. Again, this time implicitly rather than explicitly, Dr. Martin is depending on a literal rather than a metaphorical or allegorical reading of the scripture. Such literalism is confined to only a subset of Christianity. In using a literal interpretation, he makes charges of unrealism and anti-intellectualism.
The section on “What Jesus’ Practices and Teachings Neglect” again depends on literalism in interpretation. Here is the opening of the section:
“Many Christians profess to find in the moral teachings of Jesus answers to all the moral questions of modern life. Needless to say, he explicitly addressed few of the moral concerns of our society today. For example, he said nothing directly about the morality or immorality of abortion, the death penalty, war, slavery, contraception, or racial and sexual discrimination.”The implication is that since Jesus did not explicitly discuss these issues it is not possible to obtain moral guidance on them. In this case it is not scripture, but Dr. Martin that is being anti-intellectual. He fails to credit the reader with being able to extend a lesson beyond its examples.
Dr. Martin then continues stating that it is not clear what can be deduced from his sayings and activities. He tries to show that Jesus was inconsistent on the subject of poverty, and also condemns him for not explicitly condemning slavery. Such simplistic analyses do not belong in a serious book. These areas have been the subject of much comment and study over hundreds of years. When one considers that the evangelists that wrote the Gospels were selecting material to present their interpretation of Jesus and his teachings, and that they also had to work within a highly censorious atmosphere socially, not all topics would necessarily be quoted. Also slavery in Roman times varied in its causes and the way it was carried out. In fact, some slavery was voluntary. Our modern image of slavery did not necessarily fit the reality of Roman times in many cases. So not only has Dr. Martin depended on a literalism that is inappropriate, he also fails to consider the overall context of Jesus’ times vs. ours.
In the next section of this chapter, “Evaluation of Jesus’ Ethics,” Dr. Martin discusses specific “commandments” that form what he considers Jesus’ ethics. These “commandments” are a formulation by Richard Robinson, in his book, An Atheist’s Values The first is what he terms the Love of God and Faith in Jesus commandments. To quote the first paragraph:
The harsh otherworldly aspect of the Love of God Commandment is accepted by few Christians today. For example, only sects such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses hold doctrines approximating to the view that the Kingdom of God is at hand, that one should not be concerned about the future, that one should give up everything, including one’s family, to follow Jesus. Although these are clear messages of Jesus they are ignored by most Christians.Yet he goes on to expand on this, claiming that Jesus was not simply pointing out that people need to focus less on the future and more on enjoying living, but that people should rely on God for everything. He admits that many theologians reject a complete dependency on God to do it all. But he cannot resist pointing what he sees as the error, even though it is not part of mainline Christian thought. Again his discussion depends on a simple literalistic interpretation of what Jesus was saying as if it were a stenographic quote of his words.
He dismisses what he terms the Faith in Jesus Commandment by saying that it depends on the truth of the Incarnation, which he considers to already be destroyed by his discussion of it. This so-called commandment is based on an interpretation of Luke, and is also heavily dependent on the translation being used to justify it. It concerns the belief that Jesus was the actual son of God and that he claimed to be the Messiah.
The next “commandment” is labeled the Purity of Heart and Language Commandment. This is not a direct commandment but is a synthesis by Robinson from the verses in Matthew 5:21-36. Dr. Martin then goes on to discuss how these are in conflict with modern psychology, leading to harmful repression, followed by a discussion in which he points out that following certain lines of thought can indeed be harmful. He then attempts to argue that modern discussion is based on consequences but that is not what Jesus was saying, that Jesus was arguing the thoughts were harmful in themselves. Dr. Martin appears to be following someone else’s discussion and has not created his own from direct reading. The discussion of this section is inconclusive, and actually is one of the more honest sections in the book.
The Commandment of Humility is also synthesized from sayings in the Synoptic Gospels concerning giving and praying in secret, and serving others. Dr. Martin tries to first show that taken to the extreme, being totally retiring can be foolish, using a crisis example. He also tries to say that public giving may be altruistic, that it depends on motive. He also takes the extreme position of not judging others to show it is also unrealistic. He considers it unclear if a less extreme position is what Jesus meant.
At this point, the discussion of Jesus’ ethics is based on another atheist’s synthesis of the commandments from the Synoptic gospels. It also appears to be based on an absolute literalism and an ignoring of both social, Biblical, and temporal contexts. To this point, Dr. Martin almost appears to want his cake and eat it too. He admits that few modern Christians accept the harsh literal interpretation he is condemning, yet still makes the effort to condemn it. It is almost as if he desperately need to score every negative point he can.
The remainder and bulk of the chapter is spent on a discussion of the Love Your Neighbor Commandment. Here is his opening paragraph:
Whatever problems there may be with the ethical teachings and practice of Jesus as they are portrayed in the synoptic Gospels, many Christians would insist that the essential core of the Christian message is the commandment to love your neighbor. Let us sample some of the interpretations of this commandment that have been provided by recent Christian ethical theorists and see if it is acceptable. It should be clear in what follows that some of these contemporary interpretations of Christian ethics have come a very long way from Jesus’ obscure and questionable pronouncements in the Gospels. Indeed, stripped of its theological gloss, recent Christian ethics has a considerable overlap with secular ethical theory. Thus, the question arises of why it should be preferred.He chose as his examples, Paul Ramsey, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Gene Outka. He also mentions in a footnote a source for four other examples.
Dr. Martin considers Paul Ramsey’s Basic Christian Ethics to be “[o]ne of the clearest and most thoughtful interpretations of contemporary Christian ethics.” From the extensive quotes and discussion presenting Ramsey’s views, Ramsey interprets the scripture concerning loving ones neighbors as having an apocalyptic basis, but that basis is not necessary for them to be valid today. One of the points Dr. Martin makes is the dropping of the hellfire and damnation and vengefulness portions (as Dr. Martin sees them) from Jesus’ teachings. The emphasis is on Jesus mercy and kindness. Dr. Martin then says:
Non-Christians and even humanists can in principle accept Ramsey’s ethical teachings when they are divorced from their theological underpinnings, and despite Ramsey’s claim that Christian ethics cannot be separated from its religious foundation, they can be. There seems to be no reason why non-Christians and secularists could not hold Ramsey’s view about, for example, self-defense and the problems of utilitarianism. The crucial question is whether there would be any justification for them to do so.
But Dr. Martin’s payoff in choosing Paul Ramsey is that Ramsey preaches total non-resistance to anything, not even non-violent resistance. Dr. Martin then pounces on this to show that Ramsey is unjustified in his self-defense position and that his discussion of utilitarianism adds nothing to the criticisms of utilitarianism. He also points out that a justice principle might be an adequate substitute for the love of neighbor. To a secularist this may seem plausible, but not to a Christian. There is depth and implications to loving ones neighbor as oneself that go beyond a simple principle of justice. Dr. Martin also points out that ignoring indirect consequences can be harmful even if one is exactly following the principle of loving ones neighbor as oneself. He of course resorts to an extreme example, but then he has also selected an extreme example of an ethicist to discuss in the first place.
Dr. Martin’s discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr interprets Niebuhr as saying that Jesus preached an impossible ethical ideal that nonetheless has validity today as a guide to our own day-to-day ethical behavior. Niebuhr is taken as thinking that “we cannot live up to the ethical ideal of Jesus because of our human nature.” There is further explication on Niebuhr’s themes, and much of it appears fair. Martin then points out. “Although Niebuhr ties his ethical view closely to Christian religious doctrines there is no a priori reason to do so. Thus a non-Christian and even a secularist could maintain that although the ethics of Jesus is an impossible ideal, it nevertheless provides insights abut and serves as a source of criticisms of actual ethical systems.” He expands on this idea showing how a secularist might find the same ideals but with different justification.
Then Dr. Martin suddenly shifts to his belief system.
I have suggested that even secularists could accept the view that human beings are fundamentally egoistica and attempt to base their belief on the findings of history and the social sciences. However, I am skeptical that this attempt would be successful. Although the rindings of history and social science provide much evidence of human beings acting selfishly there is little reason to suppose that selfish human action is innate and unchangeable or that altruism on a worldwide scale is impossible. There is, after all, ample evidence of human beings acting on purely altruistic motives. We are far from knowing when and under what conditions, however, human beings act with unselfish motives and how altruism can be promoted.
Dr. Martin then considers that Niebuhr’s description of what the law of love amounts to as inadequate and providing clearly what it entails. On those grounds he rejects the interpretation and offers an example of having to chose whether oneself or ones neighbor dies, and the law of love providing no answer. I don’t know that any ethical system other than pure immediate self-interest does provide that answer.
The third ethicist is Gene Outka, who wrote Agape: An Ethical Analysis. Outka is shown to discuss agape as an equal regard for all humans, but a response that takes into account their needs and abilities. That despite regarding them as of equal worth, one responds and treats different people differently. Dr Martin dismisses the theological justifications for agape as being dependent on a belief in God. He does raise the idea that theological statements of is do not necessarily entail the ought of our behavior, and considers Outka to have inadequately addressed this.
Dr. Martin then briefly describes Outka’s comparisons of agape to contemporary secular ethical thinking. He then posits that there might not be any real difference between Outka’s agape and a principle of equalitarian justice combined with a principle of beneficence. His concluding discussions for this section dwell primarily on the issues of the is-ought gap, and also concludes that Outka does not generate more doubt for creating a secular version of agape than a religious one, and that the open question of how much overlap there is between secular and religious agape is not due to disagreement among philosophers but to a lack of evidence and clarity on the notion itself.
Dr. Martin then finishes the discussion of agape with the question of whether there might be times when it is moral to be selfish. He provides examples of situations where a short-term constant self-negation leads to long-term negative consequences. In this he is again taking an absolute literal extreme, which few take, as the attempt to discredit agape. He then posits that there are Christian ethicists that would not allow purely selfish action, action which does not at least indirectly carry concern for others.
He concludes the chapter with this statement:
I have argued that it is possible to develop a plausible secular equivalent to the Christian ethics of neighbor love that in this world at least may well have significant overlap with it. Uncertainty on this score reflects our ignorance over the consequences of our actions and the unclarity in the concept of neighbor love itself.As a consequence I do not see where this forms part of a case against Christianity. I think he is trying to imply that, if one can form an equivalent ethics without God or Jesus, then why bother with either? Overall, however, I consider this his best chapter in the book. Though I question his choice of Ramsey and Niebuhr as model ethicists, suspecting that they were chosen for their ease of disputation, his presentation and discussion of Outka was quite enjoyable to read and made its points well. What comes from the discussion, however, is that making a choice of belief on the basis of ethical systems is not particularly useful, since almost equivalent systems can be constructed within and outside Christianity. In fact, I would argue that such equivalence is a point in favor of tolerance on the part of both non-Christian and Christian for the other.
I will not discuss the chapter on “Salvation by Faith” in any detail. Partly this is because I have my own issues with the doctrine, and partly because I do not see Dr. Martin as raising any new significant points. It does appear that in order for him to argue against salvation, he has an interpretation of an all-good God that implies there is no judgment of people if God is all-good. He also argues that if one accounts for the “scandal of particularity,” i.e. that the infidels that have no opportunity to learn of Jesus are condemned to Hell, then there is no need for salvation by faith in Jesus.
In his concluding chapter, “Christian Responses,” Dr. Martin picks a number of positions, the main one being nonliteralism. He selects Thomas Boslooper, Rudolf Bultmann, and Richard Braithwaite as his exemplars of nonliteral interpretation. The problem is, as Dr. Martin points out, once one rejects literalism, the field is wide open to an infinitude of interpretations. What he has selected are some of the easier ideas to reject. He also makes brief mention of other Christian responses. The commentary on those is based on his earlier arguments in the book.
His concluding paragraph is of importance:
There are alternatives to rejecting Christianity but either they do not seem promising or else they transform Christianity beyond recognition. It would be far more straightforward and rational to reject Christianity outright rather than attempt to salvage it. However, for most of the 1.6 billion Christians in the world rejection if not at the present time a practical possibility. They are either unaware of the problems of the Christian faith or because their training and background, they are believers nevertheless. I have no recommendations to make here about what can or should be done about this regrettable situation.The Christianity that Dr. Martin would reject exists only for a segment of people calling themselves Christian, the Fundamentalists. Dr. Martin’s arguments rely on literal readings of the scriptures, and even there one could argue over meaning simply because of the many different translations. I have found in my own researches that all theologically important scriptures are translated to be compatible with the translator’s own beliefs. Among the nine translations I own, many passages are identical across all of them, and the critical passages are all different there being as many as nine different versions. The truth is that there are forms of Christianity that are an anathema to other forms of Christianity. It has already been transformed.
I disagree with his statement that it would be more rational to reject rather than to salvage it. Religion does more than provide a system of ethics and belief. It motivates social interaction and individual well-being. People appear to have an innate need to believe in something. In Dr. Martin’s case it would appear to be “rationality,” which he then uses to justify his belief in no-God, just as Christian scholars justify their belief in God. It is a sad commentary, however, that there are people of both types that feel they are justified in trying to force their views on the rest. What Dr. Martin fails to understand is that there is no value to educating non-questioning Christians about the problems with Christianity, as he sees them. He may have the time, energy, and ability to ask and analyze such questions, but most people do not. Even if they have the ability, they have neither the interest nor the time. Their religious beliefs are incorporated in their lives and form part of a behavioral “shorthand” when making judgments. This is of great value in day to day living. Though I question my religion deeply, I do not find other peoples beliefs regrettable. That they do not agree with me is perfectly fine. I don’t have a monopoly on the correct answers, and truth to tell, neither does Dr. Martin. His view of “1.6 billion Christians” is really quite arrogant.
This book is similar to other books of its type. It does everything it can to destroy Christianity, but fails to provide anything in its place. Overall, by the standards of what I have been reading for the past couple of years or more, this is really quite amateurish. It is a long version of much that I wrote when an undergraduate first becoming an atheist. It has an absolute dependence on literal interpretation of the scriptures, which in turn has a heavy dependence on the translation from which the words are taken. I don’t think Professor Martin would stand a chance in a discussion with a Jesuit, or many of the well-known Christian philosophers and theologians. That I, in my modest state of knowledge, could find it so easy to dispute his writing, is in itself a harsh critique of its quality. What we have here is Atheist Fundamentalism, a warping of the religious intellectual landscape to support his anti-Christian, atheistic belief structure, just as the religious Fundamentalist Christians warp the scientific intellectual landscape to support their beliefs.
posted by Bill | 12:49 PM
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